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Participation in Transition: Mobilizing Ugandans in Constitution Making

Devra C. Moehler

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Abstract Can participatory programs in transitioning countries increase the involvement of citizens beyond the level expected from individual-level characteristics, such as demographic traits, socioeconomic resources, and civic orientations? To answer this question, I examine the causes of participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process. Statistical analysis of a random sample survey of 820 citizens demonstrates that although individual-level factors play a role, many Ugandans participated because mobilizing agents pulled them into the process. I argue that programs to encourage active and equal participation will be most successful if they supplement weak indigenous institutions of mobilization and help all types of citizens to participate early on in the transition to democracy.

Keywords Democratization · Uganda · Political participation

Introduction

Motivating citizens to participate in poor fledgling democracies is a considerable challenge. Numerous studies show that socioeconomic status, civic orientations, institutional attachments, and previous political involvement are key determinants of participation in advanced industrial democracies. These assets are scarce in the democratizing countries of the developing world: resources such as education, employment, and wealth are in short supply; adults socialized under nondemocratic regimes were unlikely to acquire orientations that are conducive to civic involvement; parties and civic organizations are weak; and previous authoritarian governments stifled participation or rendered it inconsequential. The attributes that are most likely to lead citizens to participate in established democracies are rare in most countries undergoing democratic transitions, and they are particularly scarce among disadvantaged populations in these countries.

Paradoxically, the absence of the standard sources of participation may offer some opportunities. Patterns of participation are relatively stable once established and thus

D. C. Moehler (✉)
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
e-mail: dcm37@cornell.edu

seemingly difficult to alter in advanced democracies.[1] For example, Franklin (2004: 204) asserts that voting habits are formed "during the first three elections that people are exposed to as voting-age adults." During or immediately after democratic transitions when public enthusiasm is high—it may be easier to induce citizens to become involved than later on when the honeymoon period is over and habits are set. In addition, it may be easier to encourage equal participation among advantaged and disadvantaged citizens before regular recruitment networks of are established.[2] The path dependent nature of participation suggests that the activities that citizens engage in at the onset of the democratic system will long affect their behaviors, and that initial achievements in increasing the level and equality of participation will persist over time.[3] Can programs in new democracies targeted at disadvantaged groups overcome inequalities in demographic traits, socioeconomic status (SES), and political orientations—characteristics that yield participatory inequalities in established democracies? Can mobilizing agents that are active during the early stages of transition increase the involvement of all citizens beyond what one would expect from individual-level characteristics?

To answer these questions, I examine the causes of citizen participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process. The Ugandan process represents a deliberate effort on the part of government officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and donor agencies to encourage public participation in a wide variety of constitution-making activities. Unelected officials and association leaders organized programs targeted at groups that might be least likely to participate—such as women, rural dwellers, the poor, and the uneducated. Statistical analysis of a random sample survey of 820 Ugandan citizens[4]

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[1] Survey research indicates that previous participation is often the strongest predictor of current participation.

[2] Politicians, political parties, and interest groups usually target those individuals and groups who were already active in the past.

[3] Initial turnout levels could be altered slowly over time by generational replacement. Individuals socialized after the initial honeymoon period of democratization may be less inclined to turn out than their elders. Nonetheless, if younger generations are socialized during periods of high turnout, they are more likely to become habitual voters themselves and so initial levels of participation can persist even across generations (Franklin 2004).

[4] The survey, which I designed and managed, is based on a national probability sample to represent a cross-section of Ugandans aged 26 and older. The minimum age limit was designed to include only those individual who were of voting age during the constitution-making period. Nine districts (Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido, Moroto, Bundibugyo, Hoima, Kabalore, Kasese, and Kibaale) were excluded from the sampling frame because of instability and rebel attacks at the time when I conducted the sampling. Therefore, the resulting data is not representative of these troubled areas. To ensure that every adult Ugandan in the sample area had an equal chance of selection, I employed a clustered, stratified, multistage, area probability sampling design. After stratifying by urban/rural localities and region (northern, eastern, central, and western), a probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) method was used to randomly select districts, sub-counties, and parishes in successive stages. A single primary sampling unit (PSU) was randomly selected from each parish (population data did not exist at the PSU level). The randomly selected PSUs included 6 urban and 62 rural sites within 13 districts: Kampala, Jinja, Mpigi, Luwero, Nakasongola, Mayuge, Iganga, Apac, Lira, Sironko, Mbale, Mbarara, and Bushenyi. Working with the local council officials, my research teams compiled lists of all the households in each selected PSU and then selected a random sample of 16 households from each PSU list. A single individual was randomly selected from the list of household members through blind selection from a pack of numbered cards. If not available at first, two additional attempts were made to contact the selected individual before a new randomly selected household was substituted for the original household. The 92-item survey instrument was translated into the five languages using the technique of translation/back-translation to check for inaccuracies and to obtain congruence between the different languages. The survey was administered face-to-face by teams of trained native-speaking interviewers.

demonstrates that individual characteristics and orientations play a role in predicting participation. Participation is not equally distributed across traditionally advantaged and disadvantaged citizens, despite efforts to overcome these inequalities. However, the analysis also shows that Ugandans were more inclined to participate in the constitution-making process if they were connected to mobilizing agents than if they were not. Furthermore, mobilizing agents appear to be slightly more influential than individual level traits in determining who participated. Recruitment can play an important role in inducing citizens to participate in the early days of their democratic dispensation.

Background

Participation Levels and Public Policies

Verba et al. (1978: 1) defined political participation as "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take." Political participation involves a range of different activities such as voting in national and local elections, attending campaign rallies, working for candidates, contacting officials, attending community meetings, working with others on an issue, and discussing politics. It also includes a range of contentious activities such as protesting, signing petitions, and boycotting. Across nearly all of the conventional and contentious political activities for which we have comparable data, average participation rates are lower in nondemocracies, semi-democracies, and newer democracies than in established democracies (Norris 2002: 197).[5] In addition, Norris records that voting turnout rates are significantly lower in poorer countries.[6] Disparities seem to be even greater for political participation between elections (Afrobarometer 2002: 4).[7] These average figures hide substantial within-group variation, but they indicate that poor democratizing states have a participation deficit when compared to advanced industrial democracies.

The low level of participation in poor democratizing countries has garnered a great deal of attention in the policy community. Increasing participation has become a key policy objective of national governments, multilateral agencies, and NGOs. Policymakers expect that by raising the level of participation they can: foster democratic culture; build support for fragile new institutions and regimes; channel discontent into productive rather than destructive channels; increase governmental transparency and accountability; and facilitate the flow of informa-

[5] The one main exception is party membership, which appears to be higher in poor countries than in rich ones and higher in newer and semi-democracies than older democracies (Norris 2002: 121). However, these figures are based on World Value Surveys in 59 countries with a small number of poor, semi-democratic, and nondemocratic countries.

[6] Scandinavia has the highest average turnout for any region (80.8%) and North America has the lowest (50.2%). Africa has the second lowest regional turnout rate (55.5%). These figures are based on the mean turnout in national-level parliamentary and presidential elections in the 1990s (Norris 2002: 45).

[7] In round 1 Afrobarometer surveys, 47% of respondents reported attending a community meeting, 43% reported joining others to raise issues, 11% reported protesting, and 14% reported contacting an official (Afrobarometer 2002: 4).

tion between citizens and the state. Activists hope to improve democratic performance and stability by increasing participation in general; and they hope to redress social and economic inequalities by boosting participation among disadvantaged populations in particular.

Policy documents, funding reports, and aid activities reflect the growing attention to facilitating participation in developing countries. For example, political participation is the main focus of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Report 2002. In addition, the Center for Democracy and Governance of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) devotes a considerable portion of its US $700 million annual budget to increasing participation by promoting free and fair elections, strengthening outreach by political parties, fostering civil society, and decentralizing decision making. Indicators of success include,

> –Countries meeting targeted increases in citizen participation in elections, through voter education and mobilization efforts;
> –Countries meeting targeted increases in political participation by women and disadvantaged groups;
> –Increased citizen participation in policy process and oversight of public institutions; and
> –Strengthening democratic political culture.[8]

In short, policymakers are actively encouraging participation through international, multilateral, bilateral, and domestic programs.

Will these policy attempts to jumpstart virtuous cycles of participation in poor new democracies achieve the desired results? To answer this question, we need to have a better understanding of what causes individuals to become involved in politics.

Sources of Political Participation in the Literature

Numerous empirical studies exist on the causes of participation in advanced democracies and a small but growing literature exists on participation in new democracies (for literature reviews see: Dalton 2000; Leighley 1995; Nelson 1987; Salisbury 1975). The accumulated wisdom from this rich literature points to three main sources of participation: resources, civic orientations, and recruitment (Verba et al. 1995; Leighley 1995; Bratton 1999). Citizens become involved in politics when they have resources enabling them to participate, attitudes motivating them to participate, and people asking them to participate (Verba et al. 1995). Although it is now conventional wisdom that all three factors are important for predicting participation, they have not received equal attention in empirical analysis. Nearly all models of participation take into account resources, most consider attitudes, and far fewer incorporate recruitment or mobilization (Leighley 1995).

Most studies begin with the SES model of political participation that focuses primarily on individual-level demographic characteristics and on resources.[9]

[8] United States Agency for International Development (2000: Annex A)

[9] Verba and Nie (1972) use the name "SES model" to refer to demographics, resources, and engagement. In this article I use "SES" to refer to demographic and resource variables and "civic orientations" to refer to engagement and other attitude variables thought to affect participation.

Individuals with high SES face fewer barriers to participation than lower-status individuals. Empirical research on advanced democracies justifies the focus on SES; certain demographic characteristics (namely gender, location of residence, and age) and resources gained from education, income, and employment are strongly and consistently correlated with participation (Leighley 1995). Middle-aged men in urban areas with higher education, large salaries, and professional full time jobs are more participatory than individuals who do not share these traits.[10]

Second, a substantial but smaller number of studies also takes into account civic orientations. The most commonly investigated orientations fall under the rubric of political engagement, which is commonly operationalized as political knowledge and interest. Other orientations also affect participation. Empirical studies demonstrate that subjective measures of political capabilities (internal efficacy), partisan strength, democratic attitudes (such as support for civil and political liberties and tolerance), and institutional trust are also related to participation. Scholars disagree about whether these attitudes are products of rational responses to government performance or longstanding political cultures, but theory and evidence corroborate that orientations influence political behavior (Mishler and Rose 2001).

Although many scholars include civic orientations in their models predicting participation, they usually do so inadequately. Most would agree that the relationship between participation and civic orientations is reciprocal. Political knowledge, interest, efficacy, trust, and democratic attitudes are posited to increase participation, but participation is also thought to lead to a positive change in knowledge and attitudes. Yet the reciprocal relationship is seldom recognized in empirical research on the sources of participation. Even when the reciprocal nature is acknowledged, it is rarely incorporated into the specification of the models.[11] Misspecification of the relationship between orientations and participation may lead to an inflation of the effects of attitudes on participation. The coefficients for attitudes and knowledge in a cross-sectional OLS model of participation include the effect of orientations on participation and the reverse effect of participation on orientations. The relative importance of orientations versus resources or mobilization is biased in favor of orientations (Leighley 1995: 186–187).

Third, recruitment is the most understudied of the three source of participation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argued that, at times, elite mobilization can counteract the propensity for the wealthy, educated, engaged, and democratic citizens to participate more than others. Since their seminal study of mobilization, more scholars have included measures of associational affiliation, social network analysis, exposure to media, and campaign spending in their models of participation and found that mobilization significantly influences participation (For example: Brady and Kaplan 2003; Bratton et al. 2005; Burns et al. 2001; Jackman and Miller 1995; Norris 2002; Powell 1986; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Verba et al. 1995). Cross-

[10] In most advanced industrial democracies, the gender gap in voting has closed, and it may be narrowing for other modes as well (Burns et al. 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003). In contrast, the education and income gaps seem to be widening (Kittilson 2005).

[11] Some notable and enlightening exceptions are: the studies by Verba and his colleagues that use two-stage least squares procedures (Verba et al. 1997; Verba et al. 1995); analysis of panel date by Finkel (1985, 1987) and Gibson (1996); and path analyses by Clarke and Acock (1989)

national studies demonstrate that political institutions and voting rules matter, especially for voting turnout (For example: Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Franklin 2004). More research needs to be done to establish when, where, and how citizens are mobilized into politics.

Participation in Developing Democracies

Empirical studies of advanced industrial democracies consistently demonstrate that individual-level traits (such as resources and orientations) are important predictors of participation. This evidence does not encourage an optimistic assessment of the prospects for participation in poor democratizing countries. Socioeconomic resources and participatory orientations are scarce in these settings and increasing education, raising employment, and changing attitudes are difficult goals to achieve in the short or medium term.

However, some recent studies of participation in poor, transitioning, or newly democratic polities suggest that demographic traits, SES, and orientations may be less important in these contexts. In a study comparing participation in the USA, Russia, and Estonia, Brady and Kaplan (2003) find that individual skills and engagement were not very useful for explaining routine participation in Estonia and Russia, but that political recruitment and mobilization factors affected significantly participation in the recent transition period. Similarly, Bratton (1999) finds that education, urban residence, and age had no effect on participation in Zambia, though gender did. He also notes that orientations were important but that party membership and institutional linkages were even more influential.[12] Likewise, based on his research into civic education programs in South Africa and the Dominican Republic, Finkel (2000: 34) wrote, “At least in the short-term, these [democratic] orientations themselves do not necessarily appear to be powerful predictors of individual participation.” In Russia, Estonia, Zambia, South Africa, and the Dominican Republic, mobilization factors played a larger role than individual resources or orientations.

These studies of participation in semi-democratic or newly democratizing countries suggest a more optimistic policy avenue for fostering citizen involvement. Outside of advanced democracies, institutions of mobilization (such as parties and civil society organizations) are typically weak.[13] Policy interventions may be able to bolster or supplement existing mobilizing agents. Facilitating recruitment seems to be a quicker and easier route to generating participation than trying to increase education and employment or trying to change attitudinal orientations. To the extent that mobilization is more important (and individual-level attributes less important) for determining

[12] The studies by Brady and Kaplan (2003) and Bratton (1999) may overestimate the effects of orientations on participation because their empirical models do not reflect the reciprocal nature of the relationship, even though they acknowledge it theoretically. Brady and Kaplan justify the choice of a simple unidirectional OLS model by noting that the results for the reciprocal two-stage least squares model and the OLS model did not differ much in an earlier examination of the American case. Yet the effects of participation on attitudes and knowledge are likely to be larger in new democracies than in established democracies. Thus, we can not conclude with any certainty whether orientations affect participation in new democracies without explicitly modeling the reciprocal relationship.

[13] For instance, Bratton (1999) argues that the weakness of these recruitment institutions accounts for the low participation rates in Zambia.

participation in poor new democracies, policy programs to increase civic involvement have a better chance of succeeding. Furthermore, to the extent that mobilization counteracts individual-level resources as predictors of citizen involvement, policies to achieve equal participation across socioeconomic groups are more promising.

Can efforts to increase participation by supplementing mobilizing agents succeed in pulling disadvantaged individuals into politics? To answer this question, I examine the determinants of participation in one such program, the Ugandan constitution-making process.

Participatory Constitution Making in Uganda

Uganda's constitution-making process was a novel experiment deliberately engineered to increase civic involvement in government during the early period of the democratic transition (Odoki 1999). The 8-year long process was developed by local leaders, funded and supported by external donors, and enriched by local civil society organizations. Those charged with encouraging participation expanded their mandate and resources to conduct extensive mobilization campaigns. In addition, individuals and groups took up the challenge to mobilize their fellow citizens, especially for disadvantaged populations.

Three years after coming to power, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government under President Yoweri Museveni established a 21-member Ugandan Constitutional Commission (UCC) and instructed the members to "seek the views of the general public through the holding of public meetings and debates, seminars, workshops and any other form of collecting views" and to "stimulate public discussion and awareness of constitutional issues" (National Resistance Council 1988). From February 1989 to December 1992, the UCC: (1) held 86 district seminars; (2) attended educational forums in all 870 sub-counties; (3) returned to each sub-county to collect oral testimony and written memoranda; (4) analyzed 25,547 memoranda; (5) officiated over a student essay contest; (6) participated in more than 73 radio programs, 20 television programs, and 15 press conferences; and (7) prepared a draft constitution.

In addition to the commissioner-led gatherings, local governments held thousands of meetings to discuss constitutional issues and to prepare submissions to the UCC. Local government leaders and traditional elders were called upon to organize activities in their areas and to include every citizen (Oneka 1999). Throughout the process, the UCC deliberately encouraged all segments of society to participate. The members organized numerous public gatherings throughout the country and they worked through local institutions so that poor, rural, and illiterate citizens could participate along with the elites concentrated in the capital city.

The second stage of the process began with a nationwide election campaign for the Constituent Assembly (CA). Rather than letting candidates decide for themselves where and how to campaign, joint candidate campaign meetings were organized in each of the more than 3,000 parishes. Despite legal restrictions, candidates and supporters organized additional activities. The CA commission and NGOs carried out extensive civic education programs during this time.

Elections for the CA were held in March 1994. They generated the highest rate of participation in the whole constitution-making process; 7,186,514 citizens registered,

which is estimated to be more than 85% of eligible voters (Mukholi 1995: 37). Of the registered voters, 87.5% turned out.[14] There was some criticism of the CA election, but overall, it was "a transparent and open election that was perceived as a legitimate expression of the will of the people by Ugandans and the international community" (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 32).

In my interviews, respondents indicated that campaign and election activities fostered much excitement and discussion of constitutional issues—and typically did so more than the UCC-led activities. The significance of the CA campaigns and election was much greater than I initially expected. Yet the heightened importance is understandable; the CA election was only the second national election since independence (the other one being the controversial 1980 parliamentary election) and the first since the NRM had come to power.[15] Many of my respondents referred to the CA election as the founding event for their new democracy.

Citizen participation in the constitution-making process continued during the CA debates. 21.1% of the respondents to my survey reported following the CA debates in some way. State actors and citizens initiated activities. For example, the CA Commission was charged with disseminating information about the debates to the public. In addition, CA delegates were encouraged to consult their constituents on contentious issues. CA delegates often held consultations on their own accord, though this practice varied greatly from delegate to delegate. A few respondents told me that they contacted their delegates about constitutional issues or traveled to the capital Kampala to witness the debates in person.

Throughout the process, the TV, radio, and print media publicized the activities, broadcasted public debates, held call-in or write-in discussion forums, disseminated civic education materials, and reported on contentious issues and events (Kizito 1992). For example, the UCC counted 2,768 newspaper articles on constitutional issues in the period before 1992.

Civil society organizations also played a critical role in involving the general population in the constitution-making process. Some groups targeted their group members such as the Buganda Kingdom. Others, such as the Ugandan Joint Christian Council and Action for Development (the largest women's organization) sensed a momentous opportunity for social change and devoted most of their energies over seven years to educating and mobilizing the wider public (interviews with Mulondo 2001; Oneka 1999; Mugisha 1999). Some groups specifically targeted disadvantaged populations such as the National Union of Disabled Persons in Uganda and National Association of Women Organizations in Uganda (NAWOU), a coalition of women's NGOs. They worked with the Ministry of Women in Development to organize a parallel educational and consultation program during the time of the UCC specifically targeted at women. NAWOU later developed a radio program on constitutional issues called *Brain Trust*, which aired weekly during the CA tenure and arranged for rural women to communicate their views to their CA

[14] In my survey, 59.9% of respondents reported voting for a CA delegate.

[15] Parliamentary and presidential elections were also held just before independence and many of the political parties and attachments developed in this initial election persist to today. Local elections were also held before the CA elections.

delegates (interview with Nekyon 2001). These are just a few of the many local NGOs that facilitated citizen participation during the constitution-making process.

In total, the Ugandan constitution-making process involved a range of participatory activities, including (1) attending educational seminars; (2) discussing issues at local governmental and associational meetings; (3) contributing views in oral and written forms; (4) campaigning; (5) public debates; (6) elections; (7) attention to media; (8) contacting leaders; and (9) lobbying elected CA delegates. Diverse individuals and groups initiated such activities as (1) the UCC; (2) the five levels of local councils; (3) CA candidates and supporters; (4) the CA electoral commission; (5) civic educators; (6) the media; (7) schools and other institutions; (8) NRM officials; (9) political parties; and (10) a plethora of NGOs. In the end, the program included a large percentage of the population in a wide variety of activities over an extensive time period.

Uganda is among a growing number of countries that have engaged in participatory constitution-making processes:

> Clearly, there is an emerging trend toward providing for more direct and far-reaching popular participation in the constitution-making process, not only through the election of a constituent assembly or voting in a referendum on the proposed constitutional text, but also in the form of civic education and popular consultation in the development of the constitution. Some scholars refer to this as "new constitutionalism." Aspects of this approach have been employed around the world in recent years, including in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia (United States Institute of Peace 2005: 7).

The new constitution-making processes share some features with other participatory programs that are currently popular among democracy advocates, development practitioners, aid organizations, and donors; these features distinguish participatory programs in newly democratizing countries from routine participation in advanced industrial democracies. First, participation is often viewed as an end in itself, as well as a means to achieving other goals. Second, opportunities for democratic participation are relatively new for most individuals in these settings so they have not yet established regular patterns of political behavior and affiliation. Third, the groups and actors that mobilize citizens to participate (whether government officials or NGO workers) are interested in recruiting all citizens, not merely those already politically active and likely to vote. Therefore, it is possible that citizens participate in these programs because they are pulled in by mobilizing elites, and not solely self-selected based on SES, knowledge, and initial attitudes. However, it is also possible that these mobilization efforts fail to reach our rouse their target populations.

The Ugandan case provides a critical test of whether such programs to initiate participation outside of advanced industrial countries can be successful. One caveat is in order. The Ugandan process was more extensive and persisted over a longer time period than most participatory exercises to date, although it did employ the standard forms of participation (community meetings, contacting, campaigns, elections, lobbying). Additional research is needed to determine the optimal types, levels, and time period for programs aimed at generating greater or more equal participation. The Ugandan case can tell us whether mobilization is possible given concerted effort, but not how much effort is needed to ensure success.

Modeling Pathways to Participation

To assess the level and determinants of participation in the process, I conducted a survey of 820 citizens randomly sampled according to a clustered, stratified, multistage, area probability sampling design. The survey asked respondents about their participation in the constitution-making activities that took place between 1988 and 1995. In addition, it recorded demographic information; indicators of SES; attitudes and knowledge; and possible avenues of recruitment.

This section describes the statistical model used to examine the influence of resources, orientations, and recruitment on participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process. I draw on the rich literature on participation presented earlier to determine the appropriate model. However, I adapt the measures and the model to better suit what I know about the Ugandan case based on in-depth interviews, archival research, news analysis, and descriptions of the process.

Measuring Participation

The key variable of interest is the respondents' reported participation in the constitution-making activities before the promulgation of the constitution. I use two different measures of participation to check that the findings are robust to question wording. The primary measure of participation, the *Participation Activities Index*, is an index variable created from the sum of six separate survey questions. Each question asks whether the respondent participated in a specific constitution-making activity: (1) attending a seminar where a member of the UCC was present; (2) submitting a memorandum to the UCC either as an individual or as part of a group; (3) attended a meeting where people discussed questions about the constitution; (4) attending a CA delegates' meeting (a campaign rally); (5) voting to elect a delegate to the CA; and (6) obtaining information about debates in the CA.[16] The reported level of participation was moderate. The average citizen participated in one and a

[16] The Cronbach's alpha for the participation activities index is 0.73, indicating a single underlying concept, and the factors are almost equally weighted (.43, .61, .68, .65, .57, and .55). There does not appear to be a clear hierarchical ordering to the activities whereby those who participated in costly activities also participated in easier activities. For example, it is not the case that those individuals who attended a seminar where a member of the UCC was present (the least frequent and most demanding activity) also engaged in all other activities; two-thirds did not. Conversely, the most frequent activity was voting, but 21% of those who engaged in only one activity, did something other than voting. Nonetheless, I tested two different weighted index variables using the same questions as the participation activities index. First, I weighted activities more if they were more exacting in time (for both travel and attendance) and/or effort required. When the first weighted index is used, the main results remain the same as those presented in the rest of this paper except that poverty and exposure to newspapers are no longer statistically significant in the OLS model. The predictive power of the OLS model (adjusted R^2=0.38) was only slightly less than with the unweighted participation activities index. Second, I weighted the activities by the proportion of the population that did not participate. This gives greater influence to those activities that drew fewer people. Again, when I used this second weighted index, there were no changes in the main results reported in this paper, except that poverty and distance to headquarters were no longer significant in the OLS model. The predictive power of the model (adjusted R^2=0.40) was nearly the same as with the unweighted participation activities index. I use the unweighted simple sum of participation activities index in this paper for ease of interpretation.

half activities. Thirty-five percent of the sample participated in zero activities (answered no to all six questions), while only 13% participated in three or more.

The alternative measure of participation, *Respondent-Identified Participation*, comes from a different question that was asked earlier in the survey: "Between 1988 and 1995, how did you participate in the constitution-making process?" I recorded up to three activities as open-ended answers and then post-coded the responses.[17] The variable consists of the sum of the total number of activities reported; it ranges from zero, meaning no reported participation, to three, meaning three participatory acts reported (mean=0.36, standard deviation=0.60). Because this alternative measure of participation relied on respondent recall, the reported participation is even lower than the main measure. I expect the bias of the first measure, the participation activities index, to be less pronounced because it applies a uniform list of activities and relies less on respondent recall. I report the findings using the first measure and note where the results of the two measures diverge.[18]

Influences on Participation

What led Ugandan citizens to participate in the constitution-making activities? Based on existing literature, I hypothesize that participation is based on (1) resources from demographic and socioeconomic status; (2) orientations that would induce citizens to become involved in politics; and (3) factors that would facilitate the recruitment or mobilization of citizens. My model contains variables for each of these three categories.

First, the model has a series of demographic and SES variables that measure individual-level resources. The demographic variables include a dummy variable for *Gender*, a dummy variable for *Urban Residents*, and a continuous measure of *Age*. Given the traditional dominance of older men in Ugandan public life, it is reasonable to expect that participation is positively associated with being a man and being older, whereas the expected relationship with urban residence is more ambiguous.[19] As noted earlier, scholars find that SES exerts a strong influence on participation

[17] If a respondent gave just one or two answers, the interviewer prompted, "any other ways?"

[18] The correlation between the two participation measures is 0.57. It is noteworthy that both measures are self-reported participation. It is possible that some respondents forgot they participated. However, in open-ended interviews most respondents noted that these were very important activities given the nature of the topic (the constitution) and the timing of the activities (early in the transition). To assess the difference between actual and reported participation, I conducted interviews with subjects selected from lists of participants (memoranda, meeting attendance, and seminar attendance). I also matched survey respondents with names on the lists of participants and checked their answers. There were some discrepancies due to either memory loss or inaccuracies in the lists of participants, but by and large, reported participation accorded with recorded participation.

[19] Most empirical research from advanced industrial democracies, and modernization theory, would lead us to expect that urbanites are more participatory than rural residents. Yet several studies of developing countries produce the opposite conclusion. In Verba et al.'s (1978) study of seven countries, rural residents were somewhat more participatory than urban residents and Nelson (1987) concluded that rural residents in developing countries are more participatory in community activities. Based on Afrobarometer survey results from Africa, Bratton (2006) found that rural residents were significantly more likely to vote, attend community meetings, and contact informal leaders (controlling for poverty, gender, age, employed, and education).

(Brehm and Rahn 1997; Nelson 1987; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1978, 1995, 1997). The model has a dummy variable for *Primary Education*[20] and a measure of *Poverty* captured in an index variable summing how often the respondent goes without basic needs-food, medicine, fuel, and cash income.[21] Higher SES facilitates greater participation, so I expect coefficients on primary education to be positive and the coefficient on poverty to be negative.[22]

Second, the model controls for *Interest* in politics, the most commonly used measure of "psychological orientation" (Bratton 1999; Salisbury 1975; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995, 1997). Bratton (1999: 553) notes, "In comparative research, interest in politics has been shown to be positively related to political participation and to constitute a foundation on which other, more sophisticated political attitudes are built." Later in this article I examine the influence of other attitudes (and knowledge) in simultaneous-equation nonrecursive systems, which allows reciprocal feedback. Ideally, I would do this for political interest as well. Unfortunately, I was unable to adequately specify a two stage model of interest and

[20] Including measures of other levels of education did nothing to improve the predictive power of the model.

[21] The measure of poverty is based on the question: "In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) medicine or medical treatment that you needed, (c) enough fuel, and a (d) cash income? Never, rarely, sometimes, or often?" Due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate income figures from respondents working primarily in the informal economy, I tested several different measures of wealth. Only the one that measured the lower range of wealth, or poverty was significant in predicting participation. A weighted scale of the number of durable consumer goods owned by the respondents' households (owns consumer goods) was insignificant and the coefficient was virtually zero (standardized coefficient=0.01, p=0.79), nor did it improve the predictive power of the model. Another commonly used measure of SES, employment, was found not to influence participation in constitution-making (standardized coefficient=0.03, p=0.35). The correlation between the measure of poverty and the measure of consumer goods is 0.37, while the correlation between the measure of poverty and the measure of employment is only 0.09, reflecting the high level of self provisioning in Africa. Bratton (2006) conducted a more in-depth study of poverty and wealth in Africa based on the Afrobarometer surveys. He notes that in response to the open-ended question "In your opinion, what does it mean to be 'poor'?" Forty-six percent mentioned lack of food and 36% mentioned lack of money. Bratton (2006: 8) constructs a similar measure of how often respondents report going without: food, clean water, medicines, electricity, fuel and cash and he concludes that "the Index of Lived Poverty is more highly correlated with both household income and the wellbeing ladder than either of these indicators is correlated with the other. We take this as evidence that this experiential indicator meets the goal of bridging objective and subjective perspectives on poverty. We expect that this item, which combines income with other, less tangible and 'in kind' manifestations of wellbeing (like food, education and health), is a more valid and reliable construct than either alternative." Like Bratton, I find that the measure of poverty to be the most valid and reliable indication of the type of wealth that matters for political participation, and so I use this measure for the following analysis. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as distinguishing between those who are impoverished and those who more often have their basic needs met, and not for distinguishing between middle and upper class Ugandans. However, the other results in the model do not change if I include the alternative measures of wealth and employment in addition or instead of the measure of poverty (except for exposure to newspapers which loses significance when the other measures are used).

[22] In contrast, however, Bratton (2006) found a significant negative relationship between education and voting in 2005 (though not in 2000–2001), and a significant positive association between education and attending community meetings and contacting informal leaders (controlling for urban/rural residence, gender, age, employed, and poverty). In addition, Bratton found that poverty in Africa was positively associated with voting in 2005 (though not in 2000–2001), attending community meetings, and contacting informal leaders (controlling for urban/rural residence, gender, age, employed, and education).

participation.[23] Therefore, I include interest here in the simple OLS equation.[24] Readers should remember that the coefficient on the variable interest includes both interest's influence on participation and participation's influence on interest. The estimated effect of interest on participation is probably higher than the actual effect.

Third, the model includes a series of variables reflecting the context in which the participatory constitution-making process was organized and how citizens were mobilized to participate in the process. Local government councils organized many of the constitution-making activities, so members of the council and those close to them are expected to be more active.[25] The variable *Local Council Position* measures the level and position a respondent held in the local government councils and a dummy variable, *Close to Higher Official,* marks respondents that personally knew a higher-level government officials.

Associational Affiliation is another factor that is related to political involvement.[26] As noted earlier, many associations deliberately tried to increase their members' participation—especially associations that represented traditionally disadvantaged populations (such as women). I expected a positive relationship between my index of associational affiliation and participation. The model also contains a dummy variable for *Baganda Ethnicity*. Baganda leaders actively mobilized their members to take part in the constitution-making process as a way of winning provisions favored by the ethnic elite (such as federalism and the granting of political power to traditional leaders). Other ethnic groups were less effective at mobilizing members.

Individuals who were exposed to the organizers' messages were more likely to participate. In addition to working through the local councils and associations, the organizers relied heavily on the media. I expect the three variables measuring *Exposure to News* through *Meetings*, *Radio*, and *Newspapers* to be positively associated with participation.[27] The local community was the main site of

[23] I encountered two obstacles to specifying a two-stage model. First, I am unable to predict enough of the variance in the variable interest in the first-stage equation. This was especially problematic because the uneven predictive power for the two endogenous variables would probably lead to biased results (the R^2 for the first-stage equation predicting interest is 0.13, where as the R^2 for the equation predicting participation is 0.40). Second, and even more problematic, I was unable to find adequate instruments for the model. I could not find a variable that was significantly related to interest but not to participation in the first-stage equations.

[24] An alternative approach would be to exclude the measure of interest from the model. If I do this, then the coefficients on age and poverty are no longer statistically significant. All other findings remain the same, including the results about the relative influence and precision of resource variables versus mobilization variables (comparing the block of five resource variables and the five most influential mobilization variables).

[25] Local councilors were not required to participate in the constitution-making activities.

[26] Associational affiliation is an index variable that records the number and level of membership in associations based on the following question: "Now I am going to read out a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: (a) a religious organization like a church or a mosque; (b) art, music and drama clubs; c) farmers organization; (d) professional or business association; (e) credit and savings association; (f) women's organization; (g) sports or drinking clubs; (h) parents–teachers association; (i) other."

[27] These three measures record how often respondents get news about local or national politics from meetings, radio and newspapers.

participation and mobilization, so I expect that individuals who are well integrated into their communities will have higher participation rates. The model has a measure of *Community Integration* measuring how long the respondent lived in the area. It also incorporates measures of the difficulty of the road conditions leading up to the respondents' houses and the total distance from the respondents' houses to the sites of the election rallies and parish meetings. These measures record both the organizers' difficulty in conveying their message to potential participants and the burden participation placed on citizens who had to travel to the locations. I expect that the measures *Road Difficulties* and *Distance to Headquarters* will be negatively associated with participation.[28]

In sum, the model predicting participation contains individual demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal characteristics, and a set of variables measuring the likelihood that a respondent was mobilized to participate in the constitution-making process. These mobilization factors include the respondents' relationships to the government councils, civil society, and community, as well as the probability the respondents received messages from program organizers. The basic equation predicting participated is specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{participation} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1\,\text{gender} + \beta_2\,\text{urban residence} + \beta_3\,\text{age} + \beta_4\,\text{primary education}\\ &+\beta_5\,\text{poverty} + \beta_6\,\text{interest} + \beta_7\,\text{local council position} + \beta_8\,\text{close to higher official}\\ &+\beta_9\,\text{associational affiliations} + \beta_{10}\,\text{Baganda ethnicity}\\ &+\beta_{11}\,\text{exposure to news in meetings} + \beta_{12}\,\text{exposure to news on radio}\\ &+\beta_{13}\,\text{exposure to newspapers} + \beta_{14}\,\text{community integration}\\ &+\beta_{15}\,\text{road difficulties} + \beta_{16}\,\text{distance to headquarters} + \mu_i\end{aligned}$$

Results for Basic Model of Participation

Table 1 presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for the basic equation predicting participation. All of the hypothesized causes except urban

[28] It is possible—though improbable—that these factors of mobilization are also subject to reverse causation. In some circumstances, participation might cause citizens to become involved in mobilizing institutions. However, most of my measures are unlikely to be the result, rather than the cause, of participation. Local council members typically are elected because they are thought capable of delivering resources and commanding respect. They tend to be individuals who occupy important positions in traditional hierarchies, have previous contacts to higher officials, and are relatively wealthy. Most of those involved assumed positions in the resistance councils or local councils prior to the constitution-making process. In addition, the question includes previous positions. Similarly, respondents most often reported that they personally know higher level government officials because they were relatives or village-mates, relationships that existed prior to the process. Furthermore, the organizations used to construct the associational affiliation measure (religious, art, farmers', professional, credit, women's, and sports associations) are not the types of political organizations that individuals would tend to join as a result of involvement in constitution-making activities. Ethnic identity and location of residence are also not factors participation affects. Participation in constitution-making activities is, however, somewhat likely to motivate greater exposure to news. As with interest, I am unable to adequately specify a two-stage model of exposure to news and participation. Readers should keep in mind that the coefficients on the variables of news exposure potentially include both news exposure's influence on participation and participation's influence on news exposure.

Table 1 OLS regression estimates predicting participation

	A		A	B	C
	b	robust se	beta	beta	beta
Resources					
Gender (male)	0.65	(0.09)	0.22***	-	0.25***
Urban residence	0.08	(0.19)	0.02	-	−0.07
Age	0.01	(0.00)	0.06*	-	0.08
Primary education	0.48	(0.11)	0.16***	-	0.27***
Poverty	−0.02	(0.01)	−0.05#	-	−0.08*
Orientations					
Interest	0.21	(0.06)	0.11***	-	0.15***
Mobilization					
Local council position	0.22	(0.06)	0.14***	0.19***	-
Close to higher official	0.29	(0.12)	0.09*	0.12***	-
Associational affiliations	0.08	(0.01)	0.17***	0.16***	-
Baganda ethnicity	0.31	(0.11)	0.09**	0.08*	-
Exposure to news in meetings	0.17	(0.05)	0.11***	0.13***	-
Exposure to news on radio	0.06	(0.02)	0.08*	0.14***	-
Exposure to newspapers	0.07	(0.04)	0.08#	0.17***	0.18***
Community integration	0.08	(0.03)	0.06*	0.08**	0.11***
Road difficulties	−0.52	(0.26)	−0.06*	−0.07*	−0.08*
Distance to headquarters	−0.03	(0.01)	−0.05#	−0.05#	−0.06#
Constant	−0.95	(0.33)			
Adj. R^2			0.41	0.33	0.30
BIC			−2514	−2459	−2427

Note: Dependent variable is participation activities index. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis, and standardized OLS regression beta coefficients.
# p≤0.10 * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001.
N=743. Source: Author's data set.

residence are statistically significant in the expected direction.[29] Resources, civic orientations, and mobilization factors all matter. Together, the three sets of factors explain more than 40% of the variance in participation (adjusted R^2=0.41). In sum, there were many paths to participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process.

Substantively, participation is most strongly related to gender, primary education, being on a local council, and associational affiliation. Men are estimated to participate in 0.65 more activities than women. Those with primary education are estimated to participate in 0.48 more activities than those without. Compared with someone not on a local council, a low ranking official of a village council (such as the youth representative) is estimated to participate in 0.22 more activities, the chair of a village council in 0.66 more activities, and the chair of the parish level council in 1.32 more activities. An individual who becomes an inactive member of a civic association is

[29] These results are robust to different specifications of the model. As I mentioned before, if the variables for secondary education, possession of consumer goods, employment, and measures for the different ethnic groups are included these variables are not significant. In addition, they add virtually nothing to the predictive power of the model, and the effects of the other variables remain stable if they are included (with the exception of poverty and road conditions which lose some statistical significance). This is also the case if a measure of support for the NRM is included. Citizens who did not support the government in power were no less likely to participate than citizens who did support the NRM government. Including this measure of party support has no influence on the predictive power of the model.

estimated to participate in 0.08 more activities, while becoming an active member of two associations is associated with 0.24 more activities. A leader in two associations is estimated to participate in 0.48 more activities than the unassociated.

What are the relative influences of the different types of variables on participation? Were Ugandans mobilized to participate in the constitution-making process beyond what one would expect from individual-level characteristics? If the factors are considered individually, then the substantive association rank ordering based on the standardized coefficients is as follows: (1) gender-resource; (2) associational affiliation-mobilization; (3) primary education-resource; (4) local council position-mobilization; and (5–6) equally exposure to news in meetings-mobilization and interest orientation.[30] Other mobilization factors are also substantial, including close to higher official, Baganda ethnicity, and exposure to news through radio and newspapers. The remaining resource and mobilization variables have little substantive influence.[31]

To better gauge the relative magnitude of individual-level characteristics versus mobilization factors, I want to compare the combined effect of the variables in each category. Yet I must proceed with caution in doing so because the different number of variables in each block will affect the substantive and statistical effects. Therefore, I have chosen to compare the combined effect of the six individual-level variables (the five resource variables and one orientation variable) with the six strongest mobilization variables (local council position, close to higher official, associational affiliations, Baganda ethnicity, exposure to news in meetings, and exposure to news on radio).

Comparing the predictive power of the full model (adjusted R^2=0.41) with reduced versions of the model can provide some insight into the relative influence of the variable sets. The reduced models are displayed Table 1. When the five resource variables and the one orientation variable are dropped from the full model (B), the remaining variables predict slightly less variation in participation (adjusted R^2= 0.33). In comparison, when the six mobilization variables are dropped from the full model (C), the predictive power of the remaining model is even lower (adjusted R^2= 0.30). Together, the variables measuring demographics, SES, and orientations explained less of the variation in participation than the six indicators of mobilization.[32] Individual-level traits seem to be slightly less influential than mobilization in determining who participated.[33] The conclusion that mobilization mattered most is bolstered by analyses of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)

[30] These substantive rankings are based on the standardized coefficients.

[31] As noted previously, the measure of poverty may not capture wealth's full effect on participation. It is possible that a more detailed measure of wealth that distinguishes between individuals along the full spectrum from extreme poverty to great wealth might have produced a larger estimated effect. However, the complete lack of estimated influence of my measure of ownership of consumer goods suggests that wealth probably does not have a sizeable influence on participation.

[32] The predictive power of the variables is measured by the drop in the predictive power from the full model. The drop is 0.41–0.33=0.08 for the individual-level resource and orientation variables and 0.41–0.30=0.11 for the mobilization variables.

[33] Mujaju, who conducted a study of the CA campaigns and election in Fort Portal Municipality, Kabarole, supports this conclusion. Mujaju (1996: 51) writes, "NRM managed to create an environment where usually apathetic people turned up in large numbers to vote."

approximations, which allow easy comparison of nonnested models. The BIC approximations in Table 1 provide "very strong support" for the claims that both individual level traits and mobilization contributed to participation, but that mobilization provides a better explanation of who participated than the combination of individual demographics, SES, and orientations.[34]

Finally, the relative precision of the blocks of variables can be assessed with a Wald test on each set of the six variables.[35] The *F*-statistic is 23.7 for the six mobilization variables, compared to 16.8 for the resource and orientation variables. Thus, the mobilization factors seem more statistically precise than the traits of individuals.

In sum, individuals participated in the Ugandan constitution-making process because they had the resources and the motivation to do so, but also because they were mobilized by organizers, activists, and media personnel to become involved. The analysis indicates that the program organizers were successful in encouraging civic involvement. The relative influence of the mobilization variables compared to the individual-level resource and orientation variables suggests that organizers were also successful in mobilizing disadvantaged citizens who may have been left out of the process if left to their own devices. However, they did not succeed in eliminating educational or gender biases altogether.

A Closer Look at Civic Orientations

Before I conclude that mobilization had the greatest effect on participation, I need to examine additional civic orientations that might have led Ugandans to become involved in the constitution-making program. Interest in politics is the most often used indicator of orientations in studies of participation, but it may not be the only relevant one in polities undergoing democratic transitions. In this section, I examine the influence on participation of (1) political knowledge, (2) subjective capabilities, (3) democratic attitudes, and (4) institutional trust.

In examining the influence of these four dimensions, I take seriously the theoretical literature that claims that civic orientations and participation are

[34] BIC approximations can be interpreted as measures of overall model fit and "two models can be compared by taking the difference of their BIC values, with the model having the smaller (i.e., the more negative) BIC value being preferred" (Raftery 1995: 134). Table 1 provides "very strong support" for the claim that the full model (A) fits the data better than either of the reduced models (B and C), indicating that both individual and mobilizations variables help predict participation. Raftery (1995: 140) asserts that BIC differences greater than 10 correspond to posterior odds greater than 150:1 and should be interpreted as "very strong" evidence in favor of the model with the lower BIC. The difference between models A and B is 55 and the difference between models A and C is 87. In addition, the reduced model with the mobilization variables (B) fits the data better than the reduced model with individual traits (C). The difference of 32 between the BIC values provides "very strong support" for the hypothesis that mobilization provides a better explanation of who participated than individual demographics, SES and orientations.

[35] This is a test of whether the variables' effect taken together is significantly different from zero. The larger the *F*-statistic the more confidence we have that the combined effect of the variables is different from zero.

endogenous. Scholars assert that knowledgeable, capable, democratic, and trusting citizens are more likely to participate, but participation is also thought to influence civic orientations. I model the reciprocal relationships in simultaneous-equation nonrecursive systems, which estimate the influence of orientations on participation while allowing for the possibility that participation affects orientations.[36]

I estimate the four simultaneous equation models using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure.[37] In the first stage, the endogenous variables (the civic orientation variable in question and participation) are separately regressed on all the exogenous variables in the model. The predicted values from the first stage, which have been cleaned of any association with the error term, are then used in the second-stage equations.[38]

Additional Dimension of Civic Orientation

What is the rationale for examining these four concepts-political knowledge, subjective capability, democratic attitudes, and institutional trust—and how do I operationalize them? First, political knowledge can facilitate participation. At a basic level, some political knowledge is necessary for citizens to realize that participation is possible. In addition, individuals who are knowledgeable about politics may be more eager to affect political outcomes. The primary measure, *Political Knowledge,*

[36] For a detailed description of these models see Moehler (2007).

[37] Three-stage least squares estimates are not used due to the potential "spread" of specification error (Cragg 1983).

[38] The systems are identified. Most of these instruments (variables excluded from one equation in the system but included in the other) were deliberately incorporated into the survey questionnaire for this purpose. The appendix reveals that the instruments are orthogonal to the alternative dependent variable in the multivariate context. They are also uncorrelated in bivariate relationships. The first equation in each system is the same as that used in Table 1. The second equations for the four systems are as follows:

1) political knowledge = $\beta_{1,0}$ + $\beta_{1,1}$ participation + $\gamma_{1,1}$ gender + $\gamma_{1,2}$ urban residence + $\gamma_{1,3}$ age + $\gamma_{1,4}$ primary education + $\gamma_{1,17}$ secondary education + $\gamma_{1,5}$ poverty + $\gamma_{1,6}$ interest + $\gamma_{1,7}$ local council position + $\gamma_{1,8}$ close to higher official + $\gamma_{1,10}$ associational affiliations + $\gamma_{1,12}$ exposure to news on radio + $\gamma_{1,13}$ exposure to newspapers + $\gamma_{1,14}$ exposure to news in meetings + $\gamma_{1,15}$ road difficulties + $\gamma_{1,18}$ mobility + $\mu_{1,I;}$
2) political capabilities = $\beta_{1,0}$ + $\beta_{1,1}$ participation + $\gamma_{1,1}$ gender + $\gamma_{1,2}$ urban residence + $\gamma_{1,3}$ age + $\gamma_{1,4}$ primary education + $\gamma_{1,5}$ poverty + $\gamma_{1,6}$ interest + $\gamma_{1,7}$ local council position + $\gamma_{1,8}$ close to higher official + $\gamma_{1,10}$ associational affiliations + $\gamma_{1,12}$ exposure to news on radio + $\gamma_{1,13}$ exposure to newspapers + $\gamma_{1,14}$ exposure to news in meetings + $\gamma_{1,17}$ follow public affairs + $\gamma_{1,18}$ support NRM + $\gamma_{1,19}$ Nilotic ethnicity + $\mu_{1,I}$
3) democratic attitudes = $\beta_{1,0}$ + $\beta_{1,1}$ participation + $\gamma_{1,1}$ gender + $\gamma_{1,2}$ urban residence + $\gamma_{1,3}$ age + $\gamma_{1,4}$ primary education + $\gamma_{1,17}$ secondary education + $\gamma_{1,6}$ interest + $\gamma_{1,11}$ Baganda ethnicity + $\gamma_{1,19}$ Basoga ethnicity + $\gamma_{1,18}$ mobility + $\mu_{1,I}$
4) institutional trust = $\beta_{1,0}$ + $\beta_{1,1}$ participation + $\gamma_{1,1}$ gender + $\gamma_{1,2}$ urban residence + $\gamma_{1,3}$ age + $\gamma_{1,4}$ primary education + $\gamma_{1,5}$ poverty + $\gamma_{1,6}$ interest + $\gamma_{1,7}$ local council position + $\gamma_{1,8}$ close to higher official + $\gamma_{1,12}$ exposure to news on radio + $\gamma_{1,13}$ exposure to newspapers + $\gamma_{1,14}$ exposure to news in meetings + $\gamma_{1,17}$ mobility + $\gamma_{1,18}$ social trust + $\gamma_{1,19}$ exuberant trusting + $\gamma_{1,20}$ support NRM + $\gamma_{1,21}$ owns consumer goods + $\gamma_{1,22}$ improved living conditions + $\mu_{1,i}$

is an index variable.[39] Respondents were asked to identify (1) the elections that had taken place in Uganda since 1986, (2) the name of their member of parliament, and (3) the names and positions of members of the central government (up to five). The variable ranges from zero to seven with a mean of 2.5.

Second, subjective political capability might also make participation more likely. Citizens may need to feel capable and efficacious before they become involved. The measure *Political Capabilities* is an index variable constructed from five questions asking respondents to offer self-assessments of their ability to perform a range of political activities: public speaking, leading groups, influencing others, understanding government, and serving on a local council.[40] The respondent values are distributed normally from zero to 10 with a mean of 4.9 and a standard deviation of 3.1.

Third, citizens who hold democratic attitudes may be more inclined to participate than those who do not. My measure of *Democratic Attitudes* is a multi-item index constructed from five questions designed to measure the respondents' valuations of the attitude dimensions: tolerance, equality, individual rights, public involvement in government, and freedom of speech.[41] The index ranges from zero to five, with a high value indicating more democratic attitudes. According to the index, 16% of the respondents were decidedly democratic, meaning that they had the highest score on four out of five dimensions. Fifteen percent were undemocratic and scored below two on the index. The remaining 69% can be considered moderate democrats, with scores ranging from two to four.

Fourth, individuals who trust their government institutions may feel that their participation in politics will be more influential than distrusting individuals. On the other hand, skepticism may drive citizens to political action and trust may lead to complacency. The resulting prediction of its influence is uncertain. The variable *Institutional Trust* is a measure of citizen faith in four government institutions (1) the police, (2) the courts of law, (3) the local council (at the village or neighborhood level), and (4) the electoral commission. The responses were summed to create an index variable ranging from zero to four.[42] Institutional trust in Uganda is high, with a mean value of 3.1 and a 0.98 standard deviation.

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[39] I used two different measures of knowledge to verify that the findings are robust to question bias. The alternative measure is targeted at the information that was most likely to be conveyed during the constitution-making process-knowledge of constitutional content. The index variable, *Constitutional Knowledge*, comprises eight questions where respondents were first asked in an open ended question to report some things they knew to be in the constitution, and then asked in closed ended questions about specific items in the constitution. The results using the measure of constitutional knowledge are generally similar to those using the measure of political knowledge.

[40] The reliability of the index is high (Cronbach's alpha=0.82) indicating that the different questions measure a single concept.

[41] The reliability measure is low (Cronbach's alpha=0.33) but this is not surprising since I am measuring adherence to different dimensions of democracy and have no reason to assume that the different dimensions will cohere. A democratic person would be high on all dimensions, but being high on one does not necessarily cause one to be high on the others. The reliability analysis shows that the factors are weighed equally.

[42] Cronbach's alpha=0.73. The loadings on a single factor are police=0.59; courts=0.63; local council=0.44; and electoral commission=0.46. Each individual question was coded as yes=1, no=0, or it depends=0.5 (comments on "it depends" answers were written down and checked for accuracy of meaning).

Results for Simultaneous Equation Models

Table 2 presents the estimation results of the four models for only the second-stage equations predicting participation.[43] These results reinforce the findings from the single equation model. Civic orientations did not drive most Ugandans to participate; instead, mobilizing agents pulled Ugandans into the process. None of the four dimensions of civic orientations are statistically significant. If any relationship exists between knowledge, attitudes and participation, the causal arrow points away from participation and not towards it.[44] Knowledgeable, efficacious, democratic and trusting individuals were *not* significantly more likely to participate than citizens who lacked these orientations.

Conclusion

Policy programs aimed at increasing participation in the newly democratizing states of the developing world have proliferated in the past decades. This article examines one such program, the participatory constitution-making process that took place between 1988 and 1995 in Uganda. By examining the causes of participation in the Ugandan program we can assess how much these types of policies can contribute to the achievement of more participatory and politically equal societies. Fortunately, the general prognosis is good. The significance of mobilizing agents along with demographic traits, SES, and political orientations in explaining participation in the Ugandan program suggests that citizens can be recruited to participate even when one might otherwise expect them to stay home. Programs aimed at increasing and equalizing participation in resource-poor new democracies can succeed by supplementing weak indigenous institutions of mobilization.

The research confirms that the main causes of routine participation in advanced industrial democracies were also influential in the Ugandan program, which was specifically designed to increase citizen involvement during the initial phase democratic transition. Participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process is related to individual demographic, educational, and attitudinal characteristics, as well as a set of variables measuring respondent contact with mobilizing agents. To echo familiar comments on participation in the USA, individuals participated in the Ugandan constitution-making program because they had the resources to facilitate action, the motivations to become involved, and the networks to increase political recruitment (Verba et al. 1995).

The research also adds to a small but growing number of studies of participation in resource poor new democracies. Recent studies of routine participation in democratizing countries show that individual resources and orientations are less important determinants of citizen involvement while mobilization factors are far

[43] The first-stage results can be found in the appendix.

[44] Participation in Ugandan constitution-making did raise political and constitutional knowledge and heighten democratic attitudes. It had no effect on civic capabilities, and surprisingly, it lowered institutional trust (Moehler 2007).

more influential (Brady and Kaplan 2003; Bratton 1999; Finkel 2000). Similarly, my research on the Ugandan constitution-making process shows that citizens participated more because mobilizing elites pulled them into the process and less because of individually held resources or dispositions.

In addition, this study investigates the relationship between participation and a wider range of orientations than is typically the case. It does so using a method that reflects theoretical claims that relationships between participation and orientations are often reciprocal, or the reverse of what scholars typically assume. Where possible, I model the relationship between orientations and participation in a two-equation system that analyzes how attitudes (or knowledge) influence participation while simultaneously allowing participation to influence attitudes (or knowledge). The results show that orientations provide less predictive power than the standard method would conclude. Explicitly modeling the reciprocal equation is especially important in studies of new democracies where civic orientations are still being formed and are as likely to be the result of participation as the cause of it. Studies of participation that do not address the possibility of reciprocal effects may generate spurious results that inflate the influence of orientations on participation.

Finally, the study offers important lessons and encouragement for policymakers and activists seeking to increase the involvement of citizens in fledgling democracies. The Ugandan constitution-making process took place early in the transition to democracy, when public enthusiasm was high and patterns of participation and recruitment were not yet solidified. Ugandans participated in their constitution-making process in part because program organizers, government officials, and civic associations pulled citizens into the process. The scarcities of political experience, individual-level resources, civic orientations, and strong parties linking citizens to the state were at least somewhat overcome by deliberate recruitment activities. Rather than waiting for citizens in resource poor countries to acquire education, wealth, and democratic orientations, this study suggests that policymakers can increase more quickly participation by facilitating mobilization efforts. Policy intervention early in the democratization process will enable all types of citizens to participate in their new democratic systems.

While the general prognosis of this research is positive in terms of democratic development, a note of caution is warranted. If public participation in democratizing countries is primarily mobilized from above, rather than autonomously generated from below, then mass participation may fail to produce all of the desired results. At least initially, ordinary people may continue to act as “subjects” under the control of elites rather than as autonomous “citizens” who freely express their preferences and hold their leaders accountable.[45] While elite mobilized participation may be less representative and effective than autonomous participation, it is nonetheless better than low or no civic involvement.[46] Even if elites organize public participation to serve their own purposes, mass involvement can have unintended consequences that are positive for the democratization process.

[45] I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.

[46] For a summary of the debated about autonomous versus mobilized participation see Nelson (1987).

Table 2 2SLS estimates predicting participation

	A	B	C	D
Resources				
Gender (male)	0.52 (0.16)***	0.53 (0.14)***	0.54 (0.14)***	0.63 (0.10)***
Urban residence	0.06 (0.19)	0.15 (0.20)	0.03 (0.21)	0.08 (0.20)
Age	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)#
Primary education	0.37 (0.18)*	0.44 (0.12)***	0.34 (0.17)*	0.50 (0.11)***
Poverty	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.01)#
Orientations				
Interest	0.16 (0.07)*	0.16 (0.07)*	0.13 (0.09)	0.22 (0.06)***
Political knowledge	0.19 (0.20)	-	-	-
Political capabilities	-	0.09 (0.08)	-	-
Democratic attitudes	-	-	0.46 (0.42)	-
Institutional trust	-	-	-	−0.14 (0.10)
Mobilization				
Local council position	0.20 (0.07)**	0.18 (0.07)*	0.21 (0.05)***	0.23 (0.06)***
Close to higher official	0.20 (0.14)	0.22 (0.14)	0.22 (0.13)#	0.27 (0.12)*
Associational affiliations	0.07 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.02)***
Baganda ethnicity	0.27 (0.11)*	0.31 (0.11)**	0.35 (0.11)**	0.29 (0.11)**
Exposure to news in meetings	0.16 (0.05)***	0.14 (0.05)**	0.16 (0.05)***	0.17 (0.05)***
Exposure to news on radio	0.05 (0.03)#	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.03)*
Exposure to newspapers	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Community integration	0.07 (0.03)*	0.07 (0.03)*	0.07 (0.04)*	0.07 (0.04)*
Road difficulties	−0.30 (0.32)	−0.44 (0.27)#	−0.46 (0.27)#	−0.47 (0.26)#
Distance to headquarters	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)#	−0.03 (0.01)#
Constant	−1.24 (0.42)**	−1.09 (0.35)**	−2.00 (0.98)*	−0.49 (0.46)
N	731	737	740	730

Note: Dependent variable is participation activities index. Entries are unstandardized 2SLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

p≤0.10 * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001.

Source: Author's data set.

Appendix

Table 3 First-stage equation estimates for 2SLS model predicting political knowledge and participation

	Political knowledge	Participation activities index
Exogenous variables		
Gender (male)	0.58 (0.10)***	0.64 (0.09)**
Urban residence	0.00 (0.18)	0.06 (0.17)
Age	−0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*
Primary education	0.62 (0.11)***	0.49 (0.11)**
Poverty	−0.08 (0.02)***	−0.02 (0.01)
Interest	0.23 (0.06)***	0.21 (0.06)**
Local council position	0.24 (0.06)***	0.25 (0.05)**
Close to higher official	0.39 (0.11)***	0.27 (0.10)**
Associational affiliations	0.04 (0.02)**	0.07 (0.02)**
Exposure to news on radio	0.06 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.03)**
Exposure to newspapers	0.08 (0.04)*	0.06 (0.03)*
Exposure to news in meetings	0.04 (0.05)	0.16 (0.05)**
Road difficulties	−0.91 (0.29)**	−0.48 (0.27)*

Table 3 (continued)

	Political knowledge	Participation activities index
Instruments for political knowledge		
Secondary education	0.62 (0.20)**	0.10 (0.19)
Mobility	0.13 (0.04)***	0.03 (0.04)
Instruments for participation activities index		
Community integration	0.03 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)**
Baganda ethnicity	0.16 (0.12)	0.29 (0.11)**
Distance to headquarters	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.01)
Constant	1.43 (0.38)***	−0.96 (0.36)**
R^2	0.49	0.43
Tests for efficiency of instrumental variables		
F-stat. (excluded instruments)	12.00	5.13
Partial R^2 (excluded intruments)	0.25	0.03

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
# p≤0.10 * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001.
N=731. Source: Author's data set.

Table 4 First-stage equation estimates for 2SLS model predicting political capabilities and participation

	Political capabilities	Participation activities index
Exogenous variables		
Gender (male)	1.30 (0.18)***	0.65 (0.09)***
Urban residence	−0.51 (0.33)	0.11 (0.17)
Age	−0.02 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.00)#
Primary education	0.52 (0.20)*	0.49 (0.11)***
Poverty	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.01)
Interest	0.41 (0.12)***	0.20 (0.06)***
Local council position	0.53 (0.10)***	0.23 (0.05)***
Close to higher official	0.70 (0.20)***	0.28 (0.10)**
Associational affiliations	0.12 (0.03)***	0.08 (0.02)***
Exposure to news on radio	0.23 (0.05)***	0.06 (0.03)*
Exposure to newspapers	0.27 (0.07)***	0.07 (0.03)*
Exposure to news in meetings	0.29 (0.09)**	0.16 (0.05)***
Instruments for political capabilities		
Follow public affairs	0.51 (0.12)***	0.04 (0.06)
Support NRM	0.46 (0.17)**	0.01 (0.09)
Nilotic ethnicity	−0.53 (0.25)*	−0.11 (0.13)
Instruments for participation activities index		
Community integration	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.04)*
Baganda ethnicity	−0.04 (0.21)	0.29 (0.11)**
Road difficulties	−0.46 (0.54)	−0.45 (0.28)
Distance to headquarters	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.01)#
Constant	0.28 (.074)	−1.05 (0.38)**
R^2	0.50	0.42
Tests for efficiency of instrumental variables		
F-stat. (excluded instruments)	11.28	4.98
Partial R^2 (excluded intruments)	0.13	0.05

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
# p≤0.10 * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001.
N=737. Source: Author's data set.

Table 5 First-stage equation estimates for 2SLS model predicting democratic attitudes and participation

	Democratic attitudes	Participation activities index
Exogenous variables		
Gender (male)	0.22 (0.07)***	0.64 (0.09)***
Urban residence	0.05 (0.13)	0.06 (0.17)
Age	−0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)#
Primary education	0.29 (0.08)***	0.47 (0.11)***
Interest	0.16 (0.04)***	0.21 (0.06)***
Baganda ethnicity	−0.17 (0.08)*	0.27 (0.11)*
Instruments for democratic attitudes		
Basoga ethinicity	−0.27 (0.10)**	−0.10 (0.14)
Mobility	0.06 (0.03)*	0.03 (0.04)
Secondary education	0.22 (0.14)	0.10 (0.19)
Instruments for participation activities index		
Poverty	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)***
Local council position	0.03 (0.04)	0.23 (0.05)***
Close to higher official	0.13 (0.08)#	0.28 (0.10)**
Community intergration	0.01 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)*
Associational affiliations	0.00 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)***
Exposure to news on radio	0.00 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)*
Exposure to newspapers	0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)#
Exposure to news in meetings	0.02 (0.04)	0.17 (0.05)***
Road difficulties	−0.10 (0.20)	−0.50 (0.27)#
Distance to headquarters	0.00 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.01)#
Constant	2.39 (0.27)***	−0.91 (0.36)***
R^2	0.19	0.42
Tests for efficiency of instrumental variables		
F-stat. (excluded instruments)	4.71	17.33
Partial R^2 (excluded Intruments)	0.09	0.35

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
# $p \leq 0.10$ * $p \leq 0.05$ ** $p \leq 0.01$ *** $p \leq 0.001$.
N=740. Source: Author's data set.

Table 6 First-stage equation estimates for 2SLS model predicting institutional trust and participation

	Institutional trust	Participation activities index
Exogenous variables		
Gender (male)	−0.15 (0.07)*	0.64 (0.09)***
Urban residence	0.10 (0.13)	0.06 (0.17)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)#
Primary education	0.00 (0.08)	0.49 (0.11)***
Poverty	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.03 (0.02)#
Interest	0.06 (0.05)	0.21 (0.06)***
Local council position	0.01 (0.04)	0.23 (0.05)***
Close to higher official	0.02 (0.08)	0.26 (0.11)*
Exposure to news on radio	−0.02 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)*
Exposure to newspapers	−0.07 (0.03)*	0.06 (0.04)
Exposure to news in meetings	−0.01 (0.04)	0.18 (0.05)***

Table 6 (continued)

	Institutional trust	Participation activities index
Instruments for institutional trust		
Mobility	−0.06 (0.03)*	0.03 (0.04)
Social trust	0.31 (0.09)***	0.02 (0.12)
Exuberant trusting	0.62 (0.08)***	−0.07 (0.11)
Support NRM	0.25 (0.07)***	0.05 (0.09)
Owns consumer goods	−0.04 (0.02)#	0.00 (0.03)
Improved living conditions	0.11 (0.02)***	−0.06 (0.03)#
Instruments for participation activities index		
Community integration	−0.01 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)#
Associational affiliations	−0.02 (0.01)#	0.08 (0.02)***
Baganda ethnicity	0.08 (0.08)	0.27 (0.11)*
Road difficulties	0.10 (0.21)	−0.47 (0.27)#
Distance to headquarters	0.01 (0.01)	−0.03 (0.02)#
Constant	2.77 (0.29)***	−0.77 (0.39)*
R^2	0.24	0.43
Tests for efficiency of instrumental variables		
F-stat. (excluded instruments)	21.87	8.96
Partial R^2 (excluded intruments)	0.22	0.18

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
# p≤0.10 * p≤0.05 ** p≤0.01 *** p≤0.001.
N=730. Source: Author's data set.

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Devra C. Moehler is an academy scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and an assistant professor of government at Cornell University. She completed her Ph.D. at University of Michigan in 2003. Her forthcoming *Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution-Making* (University of Michigan Press, 2007) analyzes the consequences of public participation in the Ugandan constitution-making process. Her current project investigates the effects of Africa's changing media environment on mass attitudes, knowledge, and behavior. Her research interests include political communication, public participation, democratization, comparative constitution making, the international refugee regime, and African politics.